Period over which Work was Extended.—From the notice on the tower B it took 41 days for this part of the work = 278 cub. yds. of concrete.

Therefore, rate = 6·8 cub. yds. per day, which will require 30 men, assuming that 6 men with a mechanical mixer will mix and place, complete with shuttering, 1½ cub. yds. in a day of 8 hours.

It would be difficult to conceal more than about 50 men continuously at work in this nature of work, so that it may be accepted that about 50 experienced concrete makers with mechanical mixer would build the concrete structures in the farm in

$$\frac{1318 \times 30}{6{\cdot}8 \times 50} = 115 \text{ days} = 4 \text{ months, say.}$$

Transport by Light Railway.—Assuming a train of 5 trucks will bring up 20 tons of material, which is a conservative estimate and allows space for timber :—

$$\text{No. of trains required} = \frac{2421}{20} = 121$$

Allowing for intensive transport of material a week in advance of beginning work, a train per night would keep the work going and not interfere with other projects on the line.

Works Arrangement.—Attention is drawn to *Plates* 7A, 7B, which give probable position of

1. Concrete mixers run by electric power.
2. Cement, sand and stone stores.
3. Pump and water supply.
4. Light railway sidings, power line and transformer.

The ordinary concrete bucket used is as below :—



Galvanized Iron.—Contents = ½ c.f.

Overhead wires for carrying "scrim" to hide the execution of the work are shown. No indication of any concrete in Somerset Farm is given on our latest maps.

Conclusion.—It is clear that Somerset Farm belongs to the siege warfare period of the war. Such tremendous labour would have been better employed in the arsenal or the factory making weapons of destruction, provided that the raw material was available. In default of this there was no other answer to the increasing power of the British artillery than to attempt to meet it with superior protection and more centralized and effective control of their own artillery system.

Throughout the length of the Aubers Ridge it is interesting to note how closely the German High Command endeavoured to follow the battle, and how carefully their safety was arranged. This fact emphasizes their reliance on the principle of close central control in distinction to our own looser co-ordination of command

Description du site en 1920 in : Studies of German defences near Lille

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